Joint Statement on Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards in Ukraine
IAEA Board of Governors Meeting (March 2025)
Chair,
I have the honour to deliver this joint statement on behalf of the following 47 delegations: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
We appreciate the efforts of the IAEA Secretariat to monitor and report on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation in Ukraine. We continue to support the Agency’s efforts, upon the request of Ukraine, to provide technical support and assistance to help ensure the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and activities.
We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the context of our strong commitment to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the IAEA’s mandate of “Atoms for Peace and Development”.
Three years have passed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We remain gravely concerned by the continued nuclear safety and security threats arising from the Russian Federation’s military activities at and against Ukrainian nuclear facilities and related infrastructure. We reiterate the previous calls of this Board for Russia to immediately cease all such attacks.
We underscore the importance of the IAEA’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict” and the Five Concrete Principles for protecting Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant put forward by the Director General.
Russia’s presence at Ukraine’s ZNPP compromises the DG’s “seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict”, has led to the plant’s ongoing technical degradation, and continues to present serious nuclear safety and security risks to the broader region. Under such circumstances, it is essential that all reactors at ZNPP remain in cold shutdown mode.
Continued drone and missile attacks, including in the vicinity of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, pose significant nuclear safety risks with potentially severe consequences, including possible radioactive release. The drone incident causing a fire at the New Safe Confinement at the Chornobyl NPP last month is the latest deeply alarming example. This incident jeopardises decades of international progress in making the site safe and secure after one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear disasters. We also note with concern that additional nuclear sites in Ukraine, including the Neutron Source facility and a laboratory in Lyptsi modernized under an IAEA Technical Cooperation project, have also suffered damage due to Russian attacks. These reckless attacks simply must stop and all IAEA members must work to protect joint efforts and achievements of the IAEA
We also remain deeply concerned by Russia’s systematic and targeted attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including those affecting electrical sub-stations which are critical to the off-site power supply for Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. These attacks represent a direct threat to nuclear safety and security and are inconsistent with Pillar Four of the DG’s “seven indispensable pillars”.
Chair,
We support the continued physical presence of IAEA experts at the ZNPP and other Ukrainian facilities in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We also recognize the Agency’s essential role in assessing risks arising from attacks against electrical substations identified as essential for nuclear safety. The safety and security of Agency staff remains of paramount importance. We reiterate that the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) must be granted full, unrestricted, and timely access to fully report on the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP and to undertake vital safeguards activities in line with Ukraine’s legal safeguards obligations.
In this regard, we express our concern over the recent ISAMZ rotation which was completed through a different route than previous rotations while stressing the exceptional nature of this rotation. We condemn Russian actions which deliberately obstruct the work of the IAEA in Ukraine and place Agency personnel under unprecedented pressure in a high-risk environment. We welcome the Agency’s continued confirmation that it acts in accordance with all relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, General Conference, and the UN General Assembly in this regard. We call on all IAEA Member States to support the Agency’s authority, independence, and impartiality.
In line with previous resolutions of the IAEA Board and General Conference, we call on Russia to remove all unauthorized military and other personnel from Ukraine’s ZNPP and for the plant to be returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian regulatory authorities. Ukrainian nuclear power plants must operate safely and securely under the full sovereign control of Ukraine.
We also urge all IAEA Member States to offer continued political, financial, technical, and in-kind support to the IAEA comprehensive programme of technical support and assistance to Ukraine. This includes ensuring the continued presence of IAEA experts at Ukrainian nuclear sites and strengthening the IAEA’s capacity to provide real-time, fact-based, and impartial assessments of the nuclear safety and security situation.
In conclusion, we express our continued gratitude to and support for the IAEA in its continuous and tireless efforts to upholding nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation in Ukraine amidst extremely challenging circumstances.
Thank you.
Chair,
I have the honour to deliver this joint statement on behalf of the following 47 delegations: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
We appreciate the efforts of the IAEA Secretariat to monitor and report on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation in Ukraine. We continue to support the Agency’s efforts, upon the request of Ukraine, to provide technical support and assistance to help ensure the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and activities.
We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the context of our strong commitment to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the IAEA’s mandate of “Atoms for Peace and Development”.
Three years have passed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We remain gravely concerned by the continued nuclear safety and security threats arising from the Russian Federation’s military activities at and against Ukrainian nuclear facilities and related infrastructure. We reiterate the previous calls of this Board for Russia to immediately cease all such attacks.
We underscore the importance of the IAEA’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict” and the Five Concrete Principles for protecting Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant put forward by the Director General.
Russia’s presence at Ukraine’s ZNPP compromises the DG’s “seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict”, has led to the plant’s ongoing technical degradation, and continues to present serious nuclear safety and security risks to the broader region. Under such circumstances, it is essential that all reactors at ZNPP remain in cold shutdown mode.
Continued drone and missile attacks, including in the vicinity of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, pose significant nuclear safety risks with potentially severe consequences, including possible radioactive release. The drone incident causing a fire at the New Safe Confinement at the Chornobyl NPP last month is the latest deeply alarming example. This incident jeopardises decades of international progress in making the site safe and secure after one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear disasters. We also note with concern that additional nuclear sites in Ukraine, including the Neutron Source facility and a laboratory in Lyptsi modernized under an IAEA Technical Cooperation project, have also suffered damage due to Russian attacks. These reckless attacks simply must stop and all IAEA members must work to protect joint efforts and achievements of the IAEA
We also remain deeply concerned by Russia’s systematic and targeted attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including those affecting electrical sub-stations which are critical to the off-site power supply for Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. These attacks represent a direct threat to nuclear safety and security and are inconsistent with Pillar Four of the DG’s “seven indispensable pillars”.
Chair,
We support the continued physical presence of IAEA experts at the ZNPP and other Ukrainian facilities in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We also recognize the Agency’s essential role in assessing risks arising from attacks against electrical substations identified as essential for nuclear safety. The safety and security of Agency staff remains of paramount importance. We reiterate that the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) must be granted full, unrestricted, and timely access to fully report on the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP and to undertake vital safeguards activities in line with Ukraine’s legal safeguards obligations.
In this regard, we express our concern over the recent ISAMZ rotation which was completed through a different route than previous rotations while stressing the exceptional nature of this rotation. We condemn Russian actions which deliberately obstruct the work of the IAEA in Ukraine and place Agency personnel under unprecedented pressure in a high-risk environment. We welcome the Agency’s continued confirmation that it acts in accordance with all relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, General Conference, and the UN General Assembly in this regard. We call on all IAEA Member States to support the Agency’s authority, independence, and impartiality.
In line with previous resolutions of the IAEA Board and General Conference, we call on Russia to remove all unauthorized military and other personnel from Ukraine’s ZNPP and for the plant to be returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian regulatory authorities. Ukrainian nuclear power plants must operate safely and securely under the full sovereign control of Ukraine.
We also urge all IAEA Member States to offer continued political, financial, technical, and in-kind support to the IAEA comprehensive programme of technical support and assistance to Ukraine. This includes ensuring the continued presence of IAEA experts at Ukrainian nuclear sites and strengthening the IAEA’s capacity to provide real-time, fact-based, and impartial assessments of the nuclear safety and security situation.
In conclusion, we express our continued gratitude to and support for the IAEA in its continuous and tireless efforts to upholding nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation in Ukraine amidst extremely challenging circumstances.
Thank you.