Hello, dear media. Great to have you back. And good to be back with you. We’ve had a bit of a pause in our regular briefings. Mostly due to our travel. But we’re now back on track, so we will use this opportunity to cover some of the important foreign policy issues. I’ll start as usual with a brief update and then we’ll proceed to your questions. I’m sure you have plenty of them.

For our Ukrainian speaking colleagues from Ukrainian media: you can always ask me in Ukrainian in the question section and I will provide you with Ukrainian soundbites. But this is mostly an English language briefing for foreign media.

This week’s focus is, of course, the U.S. elections, no surprises here. I will not go into much detail because I am sure you will cover details in your questions. But I will just reiterate and underscore that President Zelenskyy congratulated President Trump on his impressive victory very quickly after his victory became clear. The Ukrainian leader stressed that he welcomes President Trump’s emphasis on the famous peace through strength approach in world affairs. 

In our view, this strategy, first formulated by the U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, remains highly relevant today. Indeed, we believe this is the only realistic approach in the current international environment, unfortunately. This is the approach that can ensure a strong posture for America and its allies in the face of multiple adversaries who are working together to ruin international peace and security. We think that the peace through strength approach can practically bring just peace in Ukraine closer. 

Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump held an excellent call yesterday evening. The fact that they spoke on the very first day following President Trump’s election victory speaks for itself. It proves that both sides value the Ukraine-US strategic partnership. 

And it's appropriate to remind that Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump have a long-standing, constructive, and result-oriented dialogue. They kept in contact before the elections and they will keep in contact in the following weeks and months. Ukraine values the bipartisan support in the United States. I will underscore that this is the greatest asset that Ukraine has ever had in the US — the support of both parties. And it will remain this way for sure. 

Back to Ukraine issues, today is the 988th day of Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion. We are fast approaching the symbolic day of one thousand days of full-scale war. But it is equally important to remember that this war did not start in 2022. 

It started in 2014 when Russia illegally occupied Crimea and launched the war in the east of Ukraine. 

We think that this period of time between 2014 and 2022 contains many important answers to the questions posted today. For instance, there are voices around the world saying, Why don’t you just sit down and negotiate peace with Russia? Well, to those asking this I can only reply that there is no other country in the world that wants peace in Ukraine more than Ukraine itself. But we don’t need peace at any cost; we need just, comprehensive and long-lasting peace. Is it sufficient to, as they say, “just sit down and talk” to achieve such an outcome? Well, look no further than the years between 2014 and 2022 to answer this. 

In these eight years, between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine and Russia sat down and spoke for almost 200 times, 200 rounds of negotiations mediated by France, Germany, and the OSCE. There were 20 ceasefire agreements that were agreed and all of them were violated by the Russian side. There are many reporters in this room that covered the war in the Donbas region in these years and who remember very well the process of these ceasefire agreements and how they were quickly violated. All of this eight-year peace process ended in February 2022, when Russia unilaterally tore apart all agreements and launched a devastating, all-out war of aggression aiming to annihilate our state and our people. Now, my question is very simple: why does anyone think that following the same logic and same steps will yield a different outcome today?

This is precisely why Ukraine has proposed the Peace Formula: a comprehensive vision of what genuine peace should look like. To those wondering how to achieve such a result, President Zelenskyy also proposed a very clear answer, called the Victory Plan, which is a set of concrete steps that can strengthen Ukraine militarily and diplomatically in order to force Russia to accept such a just peace. 

Last but not least, before we turn to questions. Another important event this week. Ukraine has delivered 14.5 thousand tons of corn to Malawi, a friendly African nation. Additional 4.7 thousand tons will be delivered in the coming weeks. This delivery of 19.2 thousand tons of corn is part of the humanitarian program "Grain From Ukraine," initiated by President Zelenskyy in 2022. 

We know that Malawi faced a very tough year in 2024 because of the devastating El Nino that caused drought and destroyed a major part of local maize production. In these circumstances, Ukraine decided to lend a helping hand to the people and the government of Malawi with the support of the UN World Food Programme and partners.

The delivered Ukrainian corn will cover the monthly needs of over 1.5 million Malawians. This shows that Ukraine remains committed to its role as a global food security guarantor, even in the circumstances of the total war at home. Even while Russia is striking Ukrainian ports, striking Ukrainian agricultural infrastructure with missiles, with drones. Still Ukraine finds a way to assist those in need with its food supplies.

But it's not only about providing food. Ukraine is not playing, you know, the grain diplomacy game. Ukraine also wants to share  agriculture knowledge and technology with our African partners, including the use of drones in farming, and the use of technology to boost production. We want basically to help African nations to become more self-sufficient and less dependent on any foreign aid. Because this is the value that we share as a nation.

This will be one of the main focuses of the upcoming 3rd Food Security Summit in Kyiv. It's already the third year that this event takes place. We invited and we rely on a broad representation of leaders, including leaders of African nations at this summit, at this important event. We think that it will underscore that when we all stand together in protection of our common principles, UN Charter, international law, we can really ensure security not only in Europe but also in Africa  and some other regions of the world.

At this I will conclude my remarks and I will answer your questions.

Questions from the media

• Given Trump’s past skepticism toward Ukraine, how are you approaching potential future conversations with a Trump administration transition team? What can Ukraine offer Trump and his presidency to encourage alignment with the Ukrainian perspective? Secondly, what are your current thoughts on laying the groundwork for possible negotiations, should he encourage Ukraine to enter talks? Is there value in getting ahead of potential proposals he might put forward? 

Yes. So, as I said, we maintain close contact with President Trump's team and with people around him, with the transition team, and basically with both parties. So, we have good contact with the Republican Party as well.

And this is all being discussed. I think you see the intensive contacts between President Zelenskyy and President Trump. As I said, before the elections, now, immediately after the elections, and there will be more contacts in the coming weeks and months.

So, I think the exact things on the agenda will be discussed during the following contacts, of course, because we now had a brief but excellent call yesterday, basically, with the President, congratulating President Trump, discussing some of the very general things about the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership. But, of course, with time and with the next contacts, we'll proceed to more specifics and more details. As you know, President Zelenskyy and President Trump held a very good and detailed and thorough meeting in New York when President Zelenskyy presented the Victory Plan to President Trump and his team.

We think it was very important to lay out Ukraine's  vision for how to end this war in a just way, in a fair way, and how to ensure long-lasting security, not only for Ukraine, but for basically the transatlantic community. And this is our long-standing position that remains the same today. We think that ensuring a fair, a just end to the war and a just peace in Ukraine is in the best interest of America and basically both parties. 

It's not democratic. It's not republican. It's American. It's in the American interest. This war is so much larger than just Ukraine, and it affects so many more topics and conflicts  and potential conflicts around the world. And this is why ending it in a fair way is  basically the only way that you can ensure that it doesn't cause more conflicts and more wars around the world when basically any aggressor will be compelled to follow in Russian footsteps.

I think this has been our very consistent position when we talked to all of the partners, not only the United States, explaining why actually supporting Ukraine is not charity. It's a very profitable investment in security for our partners. It's not just a moral thing to do. It's a very practical and pragmatic thing to do. And I  think we will continue to discuss this. Have I missed something on the negotiations? What was  exactly the question again?

• What are the specific aspects of the Victory Plan designed to attract the transactional phase of President Trump's administration?

It's not only for President Trump. We understand that the plan should be a two-way street. It's obviously not just Ukraine asking for something. Ukraine is, as I say, this is not a charity. Ukraine is proposing a lot of added value to transatlantic security.

And part  of this is, of course, the points of the plan concerning the strategic critical. Someone is talking with us, but we will proceed. And some of the elements that are covering this added value that Ukraine proposes are points four and five, as you rightly mentioned, concerning the strategic resources and Ukraine's role in European security. Because it is, I mean, we need to, of course, we are all now focused on very specific details, but we need to keep the broader picture in mind. We have an aggressive revanchist regime in Europe, which is Russia, the Russian Federation. Obviously, its aggressive aims go well beyond Ukraine.

So if Russia could, it would already expand its war well beyond Ukraine. Ukraine is actually the only force that is currently militarily stopping it on the battlefield from expanding the war. And the broader question is how do we ensure long-term security in Europe? Because obviously no one wants a broader war in Europe that can potentially include NATO members and can actually force the United States and other NATO members to fight in Europe.

No one wants this. And we don't want it either. And this  is why we think supporting, doubling down on supporting Ukraine right now is the best recipe in preventing and avoiding such a scenario. In any way, the Victory Plan is a two-way street, beneficial for both sides, Ukraine and partners, not only the US. It was designed in this way specifically to, of course, show that Ukraine is bringing added value to the table. It's not only, you know, a one-way street.

• I have such a question. Today, the Wall Street Journal reported about the peace blueprint which is being prepared by Trump's administration. And we know that one of the items of this plan is potentially to freeze the situation on the battlefield. I would like to ask whether this option is or could be considered by Ukraine's government.

We don't see any reason and value in discussing things that are being circulated in the media that do not represent actually the official position or proposals. These are just someone's thoughts circulated in the media. We don't see sense in giving them more weight and gravity than they have. So, I will not go into detail hypothesizing about whether we can accept or not accept or discuss those things. 

• Could you provide some details on whether Ukraine now expects Biden to fully commit to aid, lift restrictions, and deliver everything outlined in the Victory Plan? And regarding strategy, I’d like to press a bit further. It seems that Ukrainian diplomacy has relied heavily on emotional appeals—highlighting Russia’s actions as wrong and against the rule of law. However, it appears the future administration may focus more on deal-making. Does this mean Ukrainian diplomacy will shift to a more rational, less emotional approach? 

That's a perfect question. I mean, I just like, at the moment you asked this, I felt as irrational as I could be in Ukrainian diplomacy. So, first things first, the Biden administration, we are grateful to the Biden administration, to President Biden personally, for all of the support that we have received over the last, past two and a half years, which has been tremendous. President Biden's role in rallying the world and international coalition in support of Ukraine has been excellent, outstanding. I think it will go down in history this way. And we maintain, of course, close contact with the administration.

Now, in the last few months before the new administration comes in, we have voiced many times the list of specific steps that we expect in this last months. They remain relevant today. We have a situation of an existential war in Ukraine.  So, we have a bit of a different understanding of time. For us, this is not about transitions, you know, months before this one or that one administration. This is an everyday struggle for our lives in Ukraine.

And, of course, we need all of the decisions to come as quickly as possible. We don't have the luxury of waiting for many of them for weeks and months. This has been reiterated many times.

So, the list of some of the things and steps that we expect remains relevant. I want to also underline that we see the administration's efforts to use all of the allocated aid as fast as possible. And we welcome those steps, of course.

We see that the aid packages lately have been coming in bigger portions and more frequent. This is obviously something that our warriors need on the front line. And we can only welcome those steps.

 As to the approach, well, we think that we have been very rational since the very beginning. And even the use of emotions and speeches or communications is related to the situation that we have on the ground. Just right now, as we speak, we have a horrible, horrible strike in Zaporizhzhya with guided aerial bombs. And there are civilians under the rubble, including children. We don't think it's emotional. This is just humane to convey this sense of urgency, grief and horror that the Ukrainian people have been facing for years.

 Ukraine and President Zelenskyy are very oriented on achieving results and deals as well. And we really anticipate good cooperation with the Trump administration when it comes into the office in this sense. Yeah, I think I covered more or less your request. Let's go to the back row, to the gentlemen. And then to the first row. 

• I’d like to ask about the reports of North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. According to some sources, a direct engagement or clash has already occurred between the Ukrainian military and North Korean soldiers, with reports from U.S. officials indicating that a significant number of North Korean soldiers were killed in battle. Could you clarify the details of this engagement between the Ukrainian military and North Korean forces? Additionally, it seems the Ukrainian government is not fully satisfied with the international community's response to the deployment of North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. What kind of countermeasures do you expect the international community to consider?

President Zelenskyy today underlined this in his address to the European Political Community Summit in Budapest, that Ukraine warned about some of these developments long before and actually tried to ring the alarm bell about North Korean troops' engagement. But even more than this, back this summer, we heard many partners saying that they want to avoid escalation, that they really don't want to take some of the steps because these are escalatory, this can really escalate the conflict. 

And we can clearly see now that Russia doesn't need this cautiousness. It’s not impressed by this cautiousness. Russia just escalates the war when it seems appropriate or when it wants. And of course, the engagement of North Korean troops directly, regular troops, not mercenaries, regular North Korean troops into the war is an escalation of the war on the Russian side.

We think that the responses must be more decisive and much stronger than they are now. Of course, we see the concern, we see the statements and we see the recognition, for example, coming from Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte, but we need partners to act. And the list of actions that we urge has been clearly repeated many times. The lifting of all of the restrictions on Ukraine's ability to protect itself, including long-range strikes on legitimate military targets in Russia, because we can enhance the security for our people if we could use all of the capabilities that we have to strike the bases, the storages, and the places where the military is being gathered before they can approach Ukrainian borders, whether it's about Shahed drones, North Korean troops, or whatever means of terror and aggression Russia has. We don't see this step as escalatory. This is fully legitimate under international law and Ukraine's right to self-protection, self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

We know that Russia is trying to scare everyone to say that there will be a retaliation. But look, they've been doing this for two and a half years, basically trying to say that any step that the allies, Ukrainian allies, can take will lead to whatever escalation they might have. But so far, we have not seen any decision on the delivery of new types of weapons or anything cause actually any action on the Russian side. 

And we don't think that if we received all the necessary permissions and could lift all the restrictions on long-range strikes, we don't think it would cause any escalation on the Russian side. As to specific details of engagements, I think you need to address the military, because they know better the exact facts and details, whether the engagements already took place.

We know that those troops are already there. They're already fighting. I think it's a matter of time before we see more facts of them being taken prisoners of war and other specific facts that we will certainly see in the coming time.

It's important to underline that by engaging North Korean troops in the war, the security situation and threats and challenges go well beyond Europe. So this is a development that significantly deteriorates the security situation both in Europe and in Asia. We understand that this cooperation between Russia and North Korea, between those two totalitarian regimes, is going both ways.

In violation of UN Security Council resolutions, in violation of international sanctions regimes, and, of course, Russia is boosting North Korea's capabilities as well. So this is a threat that transcends two regions at least, Europe and Asia, and it should be approached as such, as a global challenge, which needs a strong and global response. Let's go back to the first row.

• Could you provide details on whether Ukraine has any diplomatic channels with North Korea, perhaps for negotiations on matters like prisoner exchanges? Additionally, could you elaborate on the South Korean diplomatic response? There’s discussion around South Korea potentially sending a delegation or other officials to observe or engage.

So we don't have any channels of communication with the North Korean side. Let's see when these facts appear of North Korean prisoners of war, and we will then see. But at the moment, we don't have any channels of communication with North Korea. As for the Republic of Korea, we have a dialogue with them, and this dialogue is actively developing right now.

We remain in close contact and coordination with them. At the moment, I will not go beyond this very vague statement, because these discussions are sensitive, and I don't want to disclose more details than I can disclose. But I can only confirm that the cooperation is ongoing. It's active and pretty intensive. 

• Two weeks ago, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced that the United States will join the G7 in allocating a $20 billion loan to Ukraine, to be repaid using revenues generated by foreign-held Russian assets. What is the legal status of Yellen’s decision? Is it final, or would a future Trump administration or the transition team have political or legal tools to potentially overturn it?

Right, thank you. There are dogs barking in our ministry, but I hope that I could hear your question well, even despite those noises. Look, on the frozen or, as they say, more professionally immobilized Russian assets, our position has been consistent and clear. 

We think that not only the profits, but the assets themselves must be used to support Ukraine in various forms, not only recovery, but also defense assistance, procurement of Ukrainian weapons, and many other elements. And we welcome the steps that have been taken in this direction, at least to fund this large loan that you referred to, covering it with the frozen Russian assets. We see that it is developing right now, and some more steps are being taken.

We think that the U.S. can and should take more steps in this regard to use all of those frozen assets to the fullest extent to support Ukraine. You see, it's fair, first of all, it's fair that Russia pays for the damage it has caused.  And it's also a very relevant way to fund the Ukrainian defense from this money.

We have heard a number of doubts and fears regarding this step from some speakers and some voices, but we think all of those fears are pretty much hollow, because it will reinforce the global financial system if all aggressors around the world see that  their actions have consequences. It will only reinforce the rule of law, not undermine the rule of law. And moreover, there are clear legal grounds in international law that allow such transfer.

There are 2001 UN articles on the responsibility of states, where it is clearly stated that states that see themselves as victims of aggressive actions, damage caused, can claim such financial retribution to cover those damages. So, it has a clear international law grounding to take those steps. We heard some of the partners, some people, experts saying that these steps, if taken fully, can really destabilize the global financial system, undermine trust in some of the European American reserve currencies.

We don't think it's really true, and it's really this way, because basically, there are no major alternatives to those reserve currencies, first of all. And we think that there would be no major effect on financial stability or trust in those reserve currencies. So, we will continue to work to use not only the profits and not only the loan, but also assets themselves to ensure that those money can be used to fund the assistance and support for Ukraine's recovery, defense, and other areas.

• It seems there’s a growing view in the international media, and possibly within international political circles, that if Ukraine were to agree to negotiate and trade territory for peace, peace could be achieved. In your earlier remarks, you spoke about why Ukraine is opposed to this, but it was somewhat implied that this is an option Ukraine could pursue. Do you see any indication from Putin suggesting such an offer is possible—where an exchange of territory for peace might be on the table? Could you clarify what you believe Putin’s real goals are, and if they go beyond the Donbas?

Yes, I could. Yeah, I think I could really be laconic and just say no, but because we have a long-standing relationship with you and good cooperation, I will elaborate on my no. We don't consider, of course, “territories for peace” swaps, because this would undermine international law and the UN Charter, something that we don't see possible. 

Putin's goals have not changed. I think he still thinks in categories of ultimatums, but he does step back when he is forced to step back. And if you look back at the beginning of the full-scale aggression, and some of the ultimatums and demands that they've put forward back then, and the way further when they saw that Ukraine not only resists, but it actually can recover some of the occupied territories, half of the occupied territory, and can really push back, I think this prompted them to scale back their demands. And if you analyze what Putin wanted in the beginning,  at least what he publicly voiced, and what he publicly voices now, we see that his war aims are shrinking.

And we believe that with sufficient pressure and strength applied not only by Ukraine, but also by partners, we can force Putin's regime to shrink those war aims further and actually accept a just peace. It's a big myth, we think, that Putin never steps back. Of course, he never admits that, but de facto he does step back when he's faced with enough pressure.

And actually, this language of strength is the only language he understands, and the only language he respects. When he senses weakness, he proceeds forward. It's only when he is faced with strength that he steps back.

And this is why we think the Victory Plan is so essential. You can't just beg Moscow for peace, you need to force Moscow to accept a just peace, not a peace at any cost. This is something that we've been trying to explain to our partners. And this is why we are open to looking into various peace initiatives, which various parties around the world propose and put forward, but we think that they need to follow international law. They need to adhere to the principle of territorial integrity and respect this principle. And they should not consider any territorial concessions, of course,  because this is not relevant.

And one more point, because you touched upon a very important topic, I think. What we need to have more in the international discourse, not only in the media, but also among politicians and everyone, is a discussion of what compromises Russia is ready to accept. In my opinion, this is a bit paradoxical that we only hear people talking about what compromises Ukraine is ready to accept.

This is fine, because Ukraine is, so to say, a rational actor here and can be addressed and can be asked for something. This is fine. And Russia is considered as an irrational actor.

But we need to discuss what concessions Moscow can, should and must make, because this is the war they started in the first place. Ukraine never sought this war and never started this war to be asked for concessions. So I don't know how to reverse this narrative and discussion.

It's probably a very difficult thing to do, but we will continue to try to shape this discussion in this way, that let's look at what concessions can and should the aggressor make, not the victim of aggression. But your question is right to the point, I think.

• We’ve noted that Ukraine's Ambassador to the U.S., Oksana Markarova, has received significant criticism from U.S. Republicans. Has there been any discussion of Ukraine potentially recalling her after the election? And could you confirm when Mrs. Markarova’s tenure is set to expire?

Yeah, actually, Ambassador Markarova is an excellent ambassador who has served a long term already in the United States, and I think her results speak for themselves, the results she achieved during her tenure, which have been widely recognized in the U.S. and in Ukraine, in the public, and among key policymakers. Her tenure is coming to an end, actually, like usual. Of course, there is no, we don't have a legally, you know, defined to one day tenure after which an ambassador goes back home.

But the usual practice is that it's around four years, which is approximately the time that Ambassador Markarova serves in the United States. I will not speculate on when and whether and how she might be replaced  or not, but there is a rotation in the Ukrainian diplomatic system, the rotation principle anyway, and all ambassadors serve and go and then go again. So this is a normal process, we should not dramatize it.

But again, this does not refer to specific ambassadors and plans, because usually, you know that we traditionally do not comment on those things. Why? Because this is a decision made by the President of Ukraine, and basically, you can comment on this or that ambassador appointed or sacked when there is a decree on the President's website.  And if you do this before that, you will apply pressure on the President, which you probably don't want to do, and which I will probably not do.

• Today, we heard Prime Minister Orbán suggest that if the U.S. cuts aid to Ukraine, Europe will struggle to sustain aid independently. If we consider the worst-case scenario, where Ukraine loses U.S. support and, to some extent, European support, is there a contingency or "Plan B" in place?

Look, our job as the Ukrainian diplomacy is not to look into apocalyptic scenarios, hypothetical apocalyptic scenarios, but rather work to avoid those scenarios and actually put into action the plan A, not the plan B or C. So I will not comment on the exact suggestions,  hypothetical suggestions of Prime Minister Orban, but I can say that Europe and the United States share in supporting Ukraine are approximately equal. This is something that many people actually miss. And I will in a moment find finally the page that  I want to find to provide you with exact numbers.

Yes. They are public, like take them with a pinch of salt, because of course they are approximate. You don't have all of the lists, all of the  countries, all the provided aid, but this is Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

This is a public tracker of Ukraine support. And when you go to this Ukraine support tracker, you find out that since 2022 and until the end of August 2024, the overall volume of the United States assistance to Ukraine is a little bit more than 84 billion euro, around 100 billion euro together with all of the, what you call it, obligations taken. So around 100 billion.

And the European overall total volume of support for this same period is 118 billion euro. This is an overall figure. And 192 billion euro with the obligations.

This is overall support, meaning military, humanitarian, financial, and other types of support. When you go to the military aid on this same tracker, you find out that from 2022 until the end of August 2024, the US military aid overall is 56.8 billion euro, while the European combined support is 54.6 billion euro, which is a comparable number. 

I think we need to look at those facts and realize that the share is, the burden is almost equal, meaning that Ukraine does not rely only and exclusively on the United States.

Although, of course, the United States is our partner number one in security matters. We do really appreciate all of the assistance that we have received. It has been huge, this assistance, but it also helped to prevent a larger war in Europe.

And I think we need to understand that this assistance had value. We think that, of course, the European partners can and should take more steps and more decisive steps to support Ukraine militarily, to invest in  Ukrainian weapons production, to invest in their own weapons productions and defense industries, because Europe's security is first and foremost the goal and the interest of Europe itself, of course. And we will only welcome European efforts or reinforced European efforts to  fund its defense more.

So, of course, we will only welcome this. But again, we are not looking into scenarios of the U.S. cutting its military aid, because this is basically,  this is not something that is, we don't think it's in the best interests of the United States  to take such a step in the first place. I also want to address those who think, I don't refer specifically to the United States, there are just voices around the world who suppose that if you cut military supplies to Ukraine, Ukraine will be forced to negotiate or, you know, forced to seek peace.

This is not true. This is simply not what is going to happen, even if such a scenario is taken. Because what is going to happen if Ukraine has less support or the support is cut, is just the war will expand and there will be more atrocities  committed by Russians against the Ukrainian people.

And this will certainly not lead to peace negotiations or peace or anything. It will just expand the scale and the scope of Russian  atrocities against the Ukrainians. And it will force, we think, the public opinion, again,  in the partner countries to restore and resume this military aid.

So this is not,  just not a realistic scenario. And people who suggest it, I think they just, this is a very vague and not practical thinking that they expose when they suggest something like this. Okay, yeah, gentleman who has not asked yet.

• Returning to the issue of North Korean involvement, following the first reported clash with North Korean soldiers, partner countries have yet to deliver a strong reaction. Do you have any indication of what actions partner countries might take, or signs that they could provide additional or stronger support in the coming days?

 Yes, we need this support. And I mean, we expect these steps to be taken.

And of course, as we see more concern about North Korean troops and more evidence coming out, we think that it's not too late, of course, to take the steps we have been urging. It's not too late to take it. And even if we sometimes underscore that the steps that we urged have not been taken yet, or they're late,  this doesn't mean that we are basically, that we are, I mean, we still expect those steps, of course, we still expect them and it's not late to take them.

And if we take them now, I already listed some of them, long-range strikes, Victory Plan, and some other steps that must be taken, it will really help us contain this escalation on the Russian side. And again, enhance security in Europe here and in Asia. And this is, I think, something that we should do.

• My question is about the Second Summit on the Peace Formula. Where do preparations currently stand? Have we determined the location, and is this summit expected to take place by the end of the year? Additionally, could you provide any updates on China’s response to the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia? Have there been any communications with China regarding this issue?

Okay, let's start with the Second Peace Summit. We continue preparations for the Second Peace summit. As you know, during August, October, there were nine thematic conferences on specific points of the Peace Formula. All of these events have already been concluded. They resulted in the adoption of joint communiques, each of those events.

And we think that those communiques, those documents create a solid base for the finalization of a joint peace framework. It's been said many times that we are working on this joint peace framework. And this document, which we plan to complete in November, will represent the position of the international community on a just end to the war, based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

So we're working on this joint peace framework. And it is the preparation of this Joint Peace Framework that is a prerequisite or, you know, a condition for holding a successful second peace summit. As we said many times, we are ready to invite the representatives of Russia to the Second Peace Summit.

When, again, the Joint Peace Framework is completed, and we understand that we can organize a successful summit. No one needs a protocol event. Everyone, I think, needs a meaningful summit and an event that can really bring just peace closer. This work continues. 

I will not name specific dates or terms, because this would undermine our position. And again, we are in the process, so it's difficult to, you know, give you an exact specific term for the Second Peace Summit. 

I think I also need to underline the Victory Plan that has been presented — sometimes people think it might be a replacement for the Peace Formula. This is not the way those two things are connected. It's not a replacement. It's a tool to enforce the Peace Formula, because, again, this Formula is a great and beautiful vision of how a real genuine peace should look like. But then  some partners, some people ask, okay, how do you achieve this? But how do you get there? And the Victory Plan is basically an answer to the question of how. This is how.

I think I have not covered your specific interest in when and in which exact country, but this is all I can say for now.

• Could you share whether countries in Western Europe, apart from the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, perceive the risk of the war expanding beyond Ukraine should Ukraine be defeated? Or do they still view this as a more localized conflict?

I think you'd need to ask them, of course, to get a clear understanding of what they think, what they don't. We usually see that there is a gradient of, what do you call it, like a gradient of concern from Ukraine and the Baltics till the West of Europe, of course, where the East, which is closer to Russia, is more concerned and the West is less concerned.

But I think the countries in the immediate vicinity of Russia, of course, feel this threat more. And this was probably the reason why Finland and Sweden were quick to join NATO in 2022 when they saw what was happening. This is not just a Ukrainian whim or, you know, something that Ukraine, a narrative that Ukraine pushes, you know, this is a reality.

And I think many of our partners in Western Europe and around the world and in the US need to be reminded of what preceded Russia's full-scale aggression, in December 2021.  And this was an ultimatum put forward by Moscow to NATO to roll back to its 1997 borders. It sometimes really surprises me that so many people forget this development.

This was what Moscow put on the table before it launched its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, an ultimatum for NATO to roll back to its 1997 borders for whatever reason. We think there is no legitimate reason for Russia to demand anything like that. But this clearly shows you that their aims and their goals and their ambitions, their aggressive ambitions, go well beyond the borders of Ukraine.

And Putin will definitely try to test Article 5 if he succeeds in Ukraine. For us, it's very, very clear. For many times in the past decades — just a small lyrical ending to our briefing today — for many times in the past, we have seen partners ignoring Ukrainian warnings, not only Ukrainian, but some of the warnings coming from Poland, from the Baltics, and some other countries. In the end, we have been proven right. We have been proven realists, not alarmists.

But we would prefer that our partners listened to those warnings when they are voiced, not after they are proven. Because in the process, territories are lost, and most importantly, lives are lost. So when Ukraine says or warns or says something now, we just really want and ask partners to listen to Ukraine now, before we need to prove those things in reality.

Okay, I think with this we conclude. I thank you for your patience. We took around an hour and I will be glad to see you again in this hall.

Thank you so much.

Video of the briefing is available here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15FXYsGUYy/